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The governments of nearly all countries are major providers of primary and secondary education to
their citizens. In some countries, however, public schools coexist with private schools, while in others
the government is the sole provider of education. In this study, we ask why different societies make
different choices regarding the mix of private and public schooling. We develop a theory which integrates
private education and fertility decisions with voting on public schooling expenditures. In a given political
environment, high income inequality leads to more private education, as rich people opt out of the
public system. More private education, in turn, results in an improved quality of public education,
because public spending can be concentrated on fewer students. Comparing across political systems,
we find that concentration of political power can lead to multiple equilibria in the determination of
public education spending. The main predictions of the theory are consistent with state-level and micro
data from the United States as well as cross-country evidence from the PISA study.
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Public schooling is one of the most pervasive social policies around the world
today. Starting with industrializing European nations in the nineteenth century,
nearlyallcountrieshave introduced compulsory schooling lawsandpublicfund-
ing of education. However, despite the near universal involvement of the gov-
ernment, private and public funding of education continue to coexist. The share
of private education funding varies greatly across countries, from only 1.9 per-
cent of total spending in Norway, to 44.5 percent in Chile (1998, see Section 6).
Institutional arrangements concerning the funding of private schools also differ
across countries. Private schools can be partly supported by the government as
in France or New Zealand, or even entirely publicly funded as in Belgium, or rely
exclusively on private funding as in the United States (Toma 1996).
Recently, the OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA),
which assessestheknowledge and skillsof15-year-old students ina cross-section
of countries, has sparked an intense debate on the relative merits of different edu-
cation systems. A central question in this debate is why education systems differ
so much across countries in the ﬁrst place. Are there particular country char-
acteristics that explain the choice of an integrated education system instead of
a regime with segregation between public and private schools? Why is it that
countries that appear similar in their overall characteristics sometimes end up
with widely different education systems? What role does the distribution of po-
litical power in a country play for education politics?
The aim of this study is to provide a positive theory of education systems that can
be used to address these questions. We develop an analytically tractable frame-
work that integrates political determination of the quality of public schools with
private education and fertility decisions. Parents have the choice of sending their
children to tax-ﬁnanced public schools or, alternatively, to opt out of the public
system and provide private education to their children. A key feature of our po-
litical economy setup is that it allows for bias in the political system, in the sense
that the weight of a certain group of voters in political decision making may be
larger or smaller that its relative size in the population. In particular, we contrast
outcomes under an even distribution of political power, such as in a represen-
1tative democracy, with outcomes when a political bias gives a disproportionate
share of power to the rich.
We ﬁnd that when political power is evenly distributed, a unique political equi-
librium exists. Perhaps not surprisingly, the extent of public versus private fund-
ing depends on the income distribution. Parents decide to send their children to
a private school if they would like to endow their children with an education of
a much higher quality than what is provided by the public system. In a society
with little inequality, the preferred education level varies little in the population,
so that all parents use public schooling. For increasing levels of inequality, an
increasing share of richer people chooses private education for their children.1
In our model, the ultimate motive behind public education provision is redistri-
bution. At ﬁrst sight, one might expect that the equilibrium tax rate should in-
crease with inequality, because a widening income distribution implies a greater
demand for redistribution. However, this demand effect is counteracted by an
opposing force: as inequality increases, more and more parents opt out of the
public system entirely, reducing the funding requirements for public schooling.
The latter effect turns out to dominate, so that the tax rate declines with inequal-
ity. This result provides a contrast to a literature where a greater degree of in-
equality motivates more redistribution through higher taxes (see Alesina and Ro-
drik 1994, Persson and Tabellini 1994, and in particular Gradstein and Justman
1997 in an application to education).
B´ enabou (2000), among others, has pointed out that in the data, more unequal
countries tend to redistribute less. Our model provides a rationale for this em-
pirical ﬁnding. B´ enabou (2000) also develops a model that is consistent with
this observation, albeit through a different mechanism. In his setup, political
participation increases with income. When inequality rises, the decisive voter is
richer and decides for less redistribution. The opting-out decision in our model
provides an alternative to B´ enabou’s mechanism. There is, however, a crucial
difference between the two theories. In our model, an increase in inequality ac-
tually improves the welfare of a poor agent of a given income, even though total
tax revenue declines. This is possible because the quality of public schooling
1This echoes the result of Besley and Coate (1991). Assuming that quality is a normal good,
households who opt out of the public sector are those with higher incomes.
2improves: the number of students who use public schools declines faster with
inequality than overall tax revenue, implying that the funding level per student
increases. Thus, even though an increase in inequality reduces the total amount
of redistribution, the transfers to public-school parents become more targeted,
leaving the poor better off.
Another novel feature of our analysis concerns the efﬁciency properties of public
education. In our theory, fertility decisions are endogenous. Consistent with em-
pirical evidence, the theory predicts that poorer parents who use public schools
have more children than parents who choose costly private schools. By rais-
ing their fertility rate relative to what they choose if they had to pay for their
children’s education, the public-school parents impose a ﬁscal externality on all
taxpayers. This externality would not be present in a model with ﬁxed fertility.
The results described so far, pertaining to democratic countries with an even dis-
tribution of political power, do not yet offer an explanation for why sometimes
countries with similar general characteristics end up with very different educa-
tion systems. This changes once we introduce bias into the political system. If
political power is concentrated among the rich, as in many dictatorships, multi-
ple equilibria with different education systems can arise. In particular, a given
population may choose either a high quality of public education with everyone
participating in the public system, or a low quality of public education with the
rich sending their children to private schools. The source of multiplicity is a com-
plementarity between the rich voters’ choice of whether to participate in public
education, and their preferred quality of public schools. Interestingly, this com-
plementarity works entirely through the political system. Previous authors have
emphasized peer effects as a source of strategic complementarities in education,
which we abstract from here.2
At ﬁrst sight, the multiplicity-of-equilibria result may seem to suggest that coun-
tries with a biased political system can experience frequent and sudden shifts
in the makeup of their education systems. However, a more appropriate real-
world interpretation of this result is path dependence and persistence of educa-
2Variable political power also plays a role for the multiple steady-state result in B´ enabou
(2000), although the mechanism is entirely different.
3tion regimes in such countries.3 The multiplicity result relies on the assumption
that voters commit to their fertility and schooling regime choices (i.e., public or
private) before the electorate determines the quality of public schooling. By com-
mitting to their choices, the voters create groups with speciﬁc interests for or
against public education that are ﬁxed ex post. It is these ﬁxed long-term choices
that give rise to self-fulﬁlling expectations regarding the quality of public school-
ing.
To assess the empirical content of the multiplicity result, one therefore needs to
c o n s i d e rt h ed e g r e et ow h i c ht h eh o u s e h o lds in a given country are locked into
particular fertility or schooling choices. Fertility clearly is an irreversible choice
that has to be made years before children enter a school. The reversibility of
the schooling choice, in contrast, may vary substantially across countries or re-
gions. If, for example, educational segregation is linked to residential segrega-
tion, switching from a private to a public school would also require moving to a
different neighborhood or city. This implies high switching costs that lock house-
holds into a particular choice for extended periods. In such a country, we would
expect the schooling regime to persist over time. If, on the other hand, public and
private schools were located right next to each other in the same neighborhoods,
switching costs would be less of an issue.
The main predictions of our theory are consistent with a set of stylized facts on
public and private schooling in the U.S. as well as in a cross section of countries.
For the U.S., we document that states with higher inequality have a larger share
of private schooling, lessoverall spendingon public schooling, but a higher qual-
ity of public schooling. At the micro level, fertility is decreasing and the proba-
bility of using private schools is increasing in income. Moreover, the slope of
the income-fertility relationship is ﬂatter in states with a higher quality of public
schooling. Similar ﬁndings are obtained in cross-country data. Using micro data
from the OECD PISA program, we conﬁrm that in a large set of countries high-
income households are more likely to use private education, while their fertility
rates are lower. Comparing across countries, high inequality is associated with a
larger share of private schooling. Concerning the role of political power, we turn
3The model presented here does not have an explicit dynamic structure; dynamics are dis-
cussed in the working paper version of this paper, de la Croix and Doepke (2003b).
4to the relationship between democracy and education funding. If we interpret
democracies as countries with an even distribution of political power, while non-
democracies are biased to the rich, our model implies that there is more scope
for variation in education systems in non-democracies than in democracies. In-
deed, using a cross section of 158 countries, we ﬁnd that the variance of public
spending across countries is smaller for democracies than for non-democracies.
Our paper relates to different branches of the literature. A number of authors
have addressed the choice of public versus private schooling within a majority
voting framework (see Stiglitz 1974, Glomm and Ravikumar 1998, Epple and Ro-
mano 1996b, and Glomm and Patterson 2002). A recurring theme in this litera-
ture is the argument that if there are private alternatives to public schools, voters’
preferences may not be single-peaked, so that a majority voting equilibrium may
fail to exist. In contrast, we rely on probabilistic voting as the political mecha-
nism, which yields a fully tractable theory of education regimes in which voting
equilibria are guaranteed to exist. Moreover, our probabilistic voting setup is not
restricted to democracies, since we can analyze what happens if the political sys-
tem is biased to the rich. The second main departure from the existing literature
is that we endogenize fertility decisions, which leads to novel implications for
uniqueness and efﬁciency properties of equilibria.
Our model makes predictions for the link between inequality in a country and
the resulting education system and quality of education. A similar objective is
followed by Fern´ andez and Rogerson (1995), who consider a model where ed-
ucation is discrete (zero or one), partially subsidized by the government, and
voters decide on the extent of the subsidy. Fern´ andez and Rogerson emphasize
that in unequal societies, the poor may forgo education entirely. Since all voters
are taxed, in thiscase publiceducation constitutes a transfer of resources from the
poor and the rich to the middle class, echoing the ﬁndings of Epple and Romano
(1996a). While these arguments are highly relevant for the case of post-secondary
education, at the primary and secondary level participation rates are high even
for poor children in most countries. Thus, at these levels the choices that we
model here (private versus public education and the quality of public education)
may be the more important margins.
A different branch of the literature takes the schooling regime (public or private)
5as given, and analyzes the economic implications of each regime. Glomm and
Ravikumar (1992) contrast the effects of public and private schooling systems on
growth and inequality. In a country with little inequality, a ﬁscal externality cre-
ated by public schooling leads to lower growth under public schooling than un-
der private schooling. In unequal societies, however, public schooling can dom-
inate, since more resources are directed to poor individuals with a high return
on education. Similar conclusions are derived by de la Croix and Doepke (2004)
in a framework which emphasizes the interdependence of fertility and education
decisions of parents. The model of Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) has been ex-
tended by B´ enabou (1996) to allow for local interactions between agents, such as
neighborhood effects and knowledge spillovers. Our work advances over these
papers by endogenizing the choice of the schooling regime as a function of the
income distribution and the political system.
Inthe nextsection, we introduce our modelandanalyze the political equilibrium.
Section 3 describes how in a democratic country the choice of a schooling regime
and the quality of schooling depend on the income distribution. Section 4 gen-
eralizes the voting process to allow for unequal political power. We show that
multiple equilibria can arise in societies dominated by the rich. In Section 5 we
analyze alternative timing assumptions. In Section 6 we confront the testable im-
plications of the model with empirical evidence. Section 7 concludes. All proofs
are contained in the mathematical appendix.
2 The Model Economy
2.1 Preferences and technology
The model economy is populated by a continuum of households of measure one.
Households are differentiated by their human capital endowment x,w h e r ex is
the wage that a household can obtain in the labor market. People care about
consumption c, their number of children n, and their children’s education h.T h e
6utility function is given by:4
ln(c)+γ[ln(n)+η ln(h)].( 1 )
Notice that parents care both about child quantity n and quality h.T h ep a r a m e t e r
γ ∈ R+ is the overall weight attached to children. The parameter η ∈ (0,1) is the
relative weight of quality.5 As we will see below, the tradeoff between quantity
and quality is affected by the human capital endowment of the parent and by the
schooling regime.
To attain human capital, children have to be educated by teachers. The wage
of teachers equals the average wage in the population, which is normalized to
one.6 Parents can choose from two different modes of education. First, there is a
public schooling system, which provides a uniform education s to every student.
Education in the public system is ﬁnanced through an income tax v;a p a r tf r o m
the tax, there are no direct costs to the parents. The schooling quality s and the tax
rate v are determined through voting, to be described in more detail later. Parents
also have the possibility of opting out of the public system. In this case, parents
can freely choose the education quality e, but they have to pay the teacher out of
their own income. Since education e is measured in units of time of the average
teacher, the total cost of educating n children privately is given by ne. We assume
that education spending is tax deductible. While tax deductibility of education
expendituresvariesacross countries, deductibilitysimpliﬁesthe analysisbecause
it implies that taxation does not distort the choice between quantity and quality
of children.7 Apart from the education expenditure, raising one child also takes
fraction φ ∈ (0,1) of an adult’s time. The budget constraint for an adult with
4The logarithmic utility function is chosen for simplicity; any utility function representing
homothetic preferences over the bundle (c,n,h) would lead to the same results. Also, while we
focus on a static framework here, the working paper version of this paper extends the analysis to
a dynamic setting where today’s children are tomorrow’s adults.
5The parameter η cannot exceed 1 because the parents’ optimization problem would not have
a solution. More speciﬁcally, utility would approach inﬁnity as parents choose arbitrarily high
levels ofeducation andarbitrarilylow levelsof fertility. Asimilar condition can befound in Moav
(2005).
6The important assumption here is that the cost of education is ﬁxed, i.e., all parents face the
same education cost regardless of their own wage. The level of the teacher’s wage is set to the
average wage for convenience.
7The same result would obtain if parents educated their own children (or at least had the
option to do so), because then the parent’s teaching efforts would reduce their taxable income.
7wage x is given by:
c =( 1 − v)[x(1 − φn) − ne].( 2 )
Education is thus either private, e, or public, s. Effective education can be ex-
pressed as the maximum of the two: h = max{e,s}. Of course, parents who
prefer public education will choose e = 0.
Substituting the budget constraint (2) into the utility function (1) allows rewriting
the utility of a given household as:
u[x,v,n,e,s]=ln(1 − v)+ln(x(1 − φn) − ne)+γlnn + γηlnmax{e,s}.
The consumption good is produced by competitive ﬁrms using labor as the only
input. We assume that the aggregate production function is linear in effective
labor units. The production setup does not playan important role in our analysis;
the advantage of the linear production function is that the wage is ﬁxed.
2.2 Timing of events and private choices
The level of public funding for education s is chosen by a vote among the adult
population. The voters’ preferences depend on their optimal fertility and edu-
cation choices (n and e), which are made before voting takes place. In making
these choices, agents have perfect foresight regarding the outcome of the vot-
ing process. This timing is motivated by the observation that public education
spending can be adjusted frequently, while fertility cannot. Similarly, the choice
between public versus private education entails substantial switching costs, es-
pecially when educational segregation is linked to residential segregation.8
At given expected policy variables v and s, the utility function u is concave in
n. Within each group, some agents may choose public schooling, in which case
their fertility rate is denoted ns, while others opt for private education; fertility
for those in private schools is denoted as ne. All parents planning to send their
8In Section 5 we will explore the implications of alternative timing assumptions.







Fertility is constant because the income and substitution effects exactly offset
each other. On the one hand, richer parent sw o u l dp r e f e rt oh a v em o r ec h i l d r e n ,
but on the other hand the opportunity cost of raising children is also higher.













Private spending on education depends positively on the wage x. Since the basic
cost of children is a time cost, having children is expensive for skilled parents. In
contrast, the cost of educating children is a resource cost, which is more afford-
able for skilled, high-income parents. Hence, they have a comparative advantage
in terms of raising educated children (as in Moav (2005)).
Notice that e is independent of the outcome of the voting process, implying that
the timing of choosing e does not affect the results (in contrast, we will see in
Section 5 that the timing of choosing between public and private schooling does





Thus, conditional on choosing private schooling, fertility is independent of x as
well. ¿From equations (3) and (5) we see that parents choosing private education
have a lower fertility rate.
Lemma 1 (Constant parental spending on children)
For given s, v and x, parental spending on children (and therefore taxable income) does
not depend on the choice of private versus public schooling, and is equal to
γ
1+γ x.
Lemma 1 implies that the tax base does not depend on the fraction of people
participating in public schooling. This property will be important for generating
9uniqueness of equilibrium. The lemma relies on three assumptions: homothetic
preferences, tax deductible education spending, and endogenous fertility. With
endogenous fertility, parents choosing private schools have fewer children, keep-
ing their total budget allocation to children in line with those choosing public
schools.9 This is a typical feature of endogenous fertility models.
A ﬁrst result is that parents with high human capital are more demanding in
terms of expected public education quality, or, in other words, child quality is a
normal good:
Lemma 2 (Opting out decision)




E[s] with: δ =( 1 − η)
1
η (6)
such that households strictly prefer private education if and only if x > ˜ x.
Here E[s] is expected quality of public schooling. An implication of the above
lemma is that if some people with income x choose the public regime, all people
with income x  < x will strictly prefer public schooling. Similarly, if at least some
people with income x opt out of public education and choose private education,
all households with income x  > x choose it as well.
We assume a uniform distribution of human capital over the interval [1 − σ,1+
σ]. Accordingly, the associated density function is given by g(x)=0f o rx < 1−σ
and if x > 1 + σ,a n dg(x)=1/(2σ) for 1 − σ ≤ x ≤ 1 + σ.10 We denote the
9With ﬁxed fertility, the resources allocated to children would be xφn with public education
and xφn/(1 − η) with private education. However, even with ﬁxed fertility a constant tax base
could be achieved through an endogenous labor supply setup.
10The uniform distribution of human capital is chosen for simplicity; other distributions would
lead to similar results. In particular, in the probabilistic voting model described below (unlike the
standardmajorityvoting model)thereis nospecialsigniﬁcance to therelativepositions ofmedian
and mean income.
10fraction of children participating in the public education system as:
Ψ =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0i f ˜ x < 1 − σ,
˜ x − (1 − σ)
2σ
if 1 − σ ≤ ˜ x ≤ 1 + σ,
1i f ˜ x > 1 + σ.
(7)
2.3 The political mechanism
The public education system operates under a balanced-budget rule:
  ˜ x
0
ns sg [x] dx =
  ˜ x
0
v(x(1 − φns)) g[x] dx+
  ∞
˜ x
v(x(1 − φne) − e[x]ne) g[x] dx,( 8 )
with total spending on public education on the left-hand side and total revenues
on the right-hand side. After replacing fertility and education by their optimal





Since the level of schooling and taxes are linked through the budget constraint,
the policy choice is one-dimensional.
The level of public expenditures, and hence taxes, is chosen through probabilistic
voting. Assume that there are two political parties, p and q. Each one proposes a
policy sp and sq. The utility gain (or loss) of a voter with income x if party q wins
the election instead of p is u[x,vq,n,e,sq] − u[x,vp,n,e,sp]. Instead of assuming
that an adult votes for party q with probability one every time this difference
is positive (as in the median voter model), probabilistic voting theory supposes
that this vote is uncertain. More precisely, the probability that a person votes for
party q is given by
F (u[x,vq,n,e,sq] − u[x,vp,n,e,sp]),
11where F isanincreasing anddifferentiable cumulative distribution function. This
function captures the idea that voters care about an “ideology” variable in addi-
tion to the speciﬁc policy measure at hand, i.e., the quality of public schooling.
The presence of a concern for ideology, which is independent of the policy mea-
sure, makes the political choice less predictable (see Persson and Tabellini 2000
for different formalizations of this approach). The probability that a given voter
will vote for party q increases gradually as the party’s platform becomes more
attractive. Under standard majority voting, in contrast, the probability of getting
the vote jumps discretely from zero to one once party q offers a more attractive
platform that party p.
Since the vote share of each party varies continuously with the proposed policy
platform, probabilistic voting leads to smooth aggregation of all voters’ prefer-
ences, instead of depending solely on the preferences of the median voter. Party
q maximizes its expected vote share, which is given by
  ∞
0 g[x]F(·)dx.P a r t yp
acts symmetrically, and, in equilibrium, we have s = sq = sp. The maximiza-




g[x]( F) (0) u[x,v,n,e,s]dx.
The weight (F) (0) captures the responsiveness of voters to the change in utility.
If there are different groups in the population that differ in their responsiveness
(their “ideological bias”), the distribution of political power becomes uneven.
In particular, a group that has little ideological bias cares relatively more about
economic policy. Such groups are therefore targeted bypoliticians and enjoy high
political power. In addition, political power may also depend on other features
of the political system such as voting rights. We will capture the political power
of each person by a single parameter θ[x]. This includes the extreme cases of
representative democracy with equal responsiveness, and dictatorship of the rich
(θ[x]=0f o rx below a certain threshold). Accordingly, the objective function
11This result was ﬁrst derived by Coughlin and Nitzan (1981). The same framework can also
be derived within the setup of lobbying models, see Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
12maximized by the probabilistic voting mechanism is given by:
Ω[s] ≡






The maximization is subject to the government budget constraint (8).
We start by assuming that all individuals have the same political power, i.e.
θ[x]=1, implying that the weight of a given group in the objective function
is simply given by its size. The role of this assumption will be further investi-
gated in Section 4. It can be checked that Ω[s] is strictly concave. Replacing ˜ x by
2σΨ + 1 − σ into the objective, taking the ﬁrst-order condition for a maximum,





From this expression we can see that s is decreasing in the participation rate Ψ:
when more children participate in public schools, spending per child is reduced.





we observe that a rise in participation is followed by a less than proportional rise
in taxation. Since, by Lemma 1, the taxable income is unaffected by increased
participation, this translates into lower spending per child. To see the intuition
for this result, consider the consequences of increasing Ψ for a given s.I n t h e
welfare function maximized by the political system, the increase in Ψ leads to
a proportional increase in the marginal beneﬁt of increasing schooling s,s i n c e
more children beneﬁt from public education. The marginal cost of taxation, in
contrast, increases more than proportionally, since the higher required taxes re-
duce consumption and increase marginal utilities. To equate marginal costs and
beneﬁts, an increase in Ψ is therefore met by a reduction in s.














Figure 1: The ﬁxed point with σ = 0.5 (left) and σ = 0.8 (right)
2.4 The equilibrium
So far, we have taken the participation rate Ψ as given, and solved for the cor-
responding voting outcome concerning the quality of public schools. In equilib-
rium, the choice whether or not to participate in public schooling has to be opti-
mal. In the deﬁnition of equilibrium we will use an earlier result: the incentive to
use private schooling is increasing in income (Lemma 2). As a consequence, any
equilibrium is characterized by an income threshold ˜ x such that people choose
public education below ˜ x and private education above ˜ x. This leads to the fol-
lowing deﬁnition of an equilibrium:
Deﬁnition 1 (Equilibrium)
An equilibrium consists of an income threshold ˜ x satisfying (6), a fertility rule n = ns
for x ≤ ˜ xa n dn= ne for x > ˜ x, a private education decision e = 0 for x ≤ ˜ xa n d
e = e[x] for x > ˜ x, and aggregate variables (Ψ,s,v) given by equations (7), (11) and
(12), such that the perfect foresight condition holds:
E[s]=s. (13)
Proposition 1 (Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium)
An equilibrium exists and is unique.
14To see the intuition for the result, notice that participation in public schooling is
a continuously increasing function of expected school quality through equations
(7) and (6). Actual school quality, in turn, is a continuous and decreasing function
of participation. Combining these results, we can construct a continuous and
decreasing mapping from expected to actual school quality. This mapping has a
unique ﬁxed point, which characterizes the equilibrium.
The uniqueness result relies on endogenous fertility. If one assumes, to the con-
trary, that fertility is exogenous and constant, Lemma 1 no longer holds, and the
tax basis increases with participation Ψ.I ft h et a x - b a s i se f f e c ti ss u f ﬁ c i e n t l yp r o -
nounced, the actual schooling level will no longer decrease in participation, and
the equilibrium mapping may fail to have a unique ﬁxed point.
Figure 1 shows two numerical examples of the ﬁxed point mapping. The chosen
parameters are: γ = 0.4, η = 0.55, φ = 0.075. The implied fertility levels are
ne = 1, ns = 2.22. In the left panel, σ = 0.5, and we have s = 0.034 and Ψ = 1.I n
the right panel, σ = 0.8, and we have s = 0.037 and Ψ = 0.96.
3 Comparing the Education Regimes






In the fully public regime, all children go to public school. Undersegregation, the
most skilled parents send their children to private school, while others use public
schools. In the fully private regime, everybody attends private schools. We ﬁrst
derive the conditions under which each education regime arises. The following
proposition summarizes the results.
15Proposition 2 (Occurrence of education regimes)
The fully private regime is not an equilibrium outcome.
Whether public schooling can arise in equilibrium depends on the preference parameters
γ and η. Let ˆ γ =( 1 − δ − η)/(δη).
If γ > ˆ γ, public education is not an equilibrium outcome and Ψ < 1/2 for any σ.
If γ < ˆ γ, the fully public regime prevails if and only if




Otherwise, we have segregation with Ψ > 1/2.
Let us ﬁrst explain why the fully private regime cannot be an equilibrium out-
come. When participation is very low (Ψ → 0), high quality public education
can be provided at very low tax levels. The quality of public schools is then
sufﬁciently high (s → ηφ) for the poorest parents to prefer public over private
education.
To see whether a fully public regime can arise, we have to look at the preferences
of the richest person. If this person has a high income relative to the average
(high σ), the preferred education quality is sufﬁciently larger than publicly pro-
vided schooling for private education to be optimal. The effect of inequality on
segregation is established in the next proposition. The fully public regime arises
only if the income distribution is sufﬁciently compressed, so that the preferred
education level varies little in the population. From now on we restrict attention
to the region of the parameter space where the fully public regime can occur for a
sufﬁciently compressed income distribution, and where at any time at least half
the population is in public schools.
Assumption 1 The model parameters satisfy:
γ < ˆ γ ≡
1 − δ − η
δη
.
16As in nearly all countries participation in public schools far exceeds 50 percent,
this is the empirically relevant case.12
Proposition 3 (Inequality and segregation) Under Assumption 1, an increase in











The inequalities are strict if a positive fraction of parents already uses private schools.
Higher income inequality leads to lower participation in public schools and more
segregation (Ψ closer to 1/2) if the majority of the population is in public schools.
Intuitively, in this case an increase in inequality raises the income of the marginal
person (who was just indifferent between private and public schooling before
the increase in inequality). As a consequence, the preferred level of education
increases, and this person now strictly prefers private schooling. The lower par-
ticipation in public schooling after an increase in inequality also implies that the
tax rate goes down. Thus, despite the increased demand for redistribution, ev-
erybody is taxed less as more parents opt out of the public schooling system.
The preferences of households at the income threshold ˜ x are linked to the rela-
tive quality of public versus private schooling. At the threshold, households are
indifferent between both types of schools. This implies that the quality they re-
ceive from public schools is lower than the one from private schools, since the
gap between the two has to compensate for higher costs of private education.
This result is consistent with the literature devoted to the estimation of the rela-
tive quality of private education, correcting for the effect of higher social class of
the pupils in the private sector. The majority of the results suggest that control-
ling for sample selectivity reduces the achievement advantage of private school
students over public school students, but does not eliminate it.13
12Put differently, using the calibrated parameter values η = 0.6 and φ = 0.075 from de la Croix
and Doepke (2003a), Assumption 1 can be read as a condition on fertility ns (see Equation (3)).
The condition imposes ns < 7.79 per person, which requires fertility per woman to be smaller
than 15.6 children.
13SeeKingdon (1996)forIndia,BediandGarg(2000)forIndonesia, Alderman,Orazem,andPa-
terno (2001) for Pakistan, Vandenberghe and Robin (2003) for Brazil and Neal (1997) for Catholic
U.S. schools. Some other studies ﬁnd no difference between private and public schools perfor-
mances (see Goldhaber (1996)).
17Notice that if Assumption 1 is satisﬁed, the unique equilibrium in a economy
without inequality (σ = 0) is fully public schooling. The result may seem sur-
prising at ﬁrst sight, because public schooling implies a ﬁscal externality. In an
equitable society, the social optimum would be pure private schooling. The rea-
son whypublicschooling arisesneverthelessislinked toourtimingassumptions.
If parents commit to a schooling choice before the schooling quality is set, a hold-
up problem arises. From an ex ante perspective, it would be socially optimal for
everybody to commit to using private schools. Ex post, however, if some parents
decide to go for public schools anyway, the political system will provide a qual-
ity of public schooling that makes this decision optimal after the fact. Thus, the
expectation that a certain public service will be provided creates a constituency
that ensures that the service will be provided in reality.
4 Political Power and Multiple Equilibria
In this section, we relax the earlier assumption that each member of the popula-
tion carries equal weight in the voting process. We will see that if political power
is concentrated among high-income individuals, multiple equilibria can arise.
As a particularly simple form of variable political power, we consider outcomes
with a minimum-income restriction for voting. There is now a threshold ¯ x such
that only individuals with income x ≥ ¯ x are allowed to vote.14 All individ-
uals above the threshold continue to carry equal weight in the voting process.
This formulation captures property restrictions on voting, which were common
in the early phases of many democracies. Similar cases of political exclusion
can also arise from literacy requirements, age restrictions on voting (given that
young people tend to be relatively poor), citizenship restrictions (assuming that
recent immigrants are poorer on average than the native population), and polit-
ical mechanisms other than voting (such as lobbying and bribery) that favor the
rich in either democracies on non-democracies.
14Similar results would obtain if individuals below the threshold had positive, but sufﬁciently
low weight in the political mechanism.
18The objective function of the political system is now given by:
Ω[s] ≡






Replacing ˜ x by 2σΨ +1− σ into the objective, taking the ﬁrst-order condition for
a maximum, and solving for s yields:
If Ψ ≥
¯ x − (1 − σ)
2σ
, s =
ηφ((1 − σ) − ¯ x + 2σΨ)
Ψ(γη ((1 − σ) − ¯ x + 2σΨ)+( 1 + σ) − ¯ x)
. (15)
If Ψ <
¯ x − (1 − σ)
2σ
, s = 0.
Hence, with a biased political system corner solutions with a schooling quality
of zero may arise. The equilibrium schooling quality s satisﬁes:
s = max
 
ηφ(1 − σ − ¯ x + 2σΨ)




The corresponding tax rate is still given by (12). A few properties of (16) are of
















where the right-hand side is the schooling level that arises with equal political





just as in the case with equal political power. In the new formulation with vari-
able voting power, the existence of equilibrium can still be proven. However, the
equilibrium is no longer necessarily unique. It is also no longer true that the fully
private regime never exists (as we showed in Proposition 2 for the democratic
case of an even distribution of political power). In fact, in the biased political







Figure 2: The ﬁxed point with multiple equilibria (σ = 0.5, ¯ x = 0.7)
system pure private schooling is always an equilibrium outcome.
As soon as ˜ x is smaller than ¯ x, i.e., all voters expect to send their children to
private schools, the chosen school quality is zero. Intuitively, these voters care
only about taxes, but not about the quality of public schools that they do not use.
As a consequence, private schooling becomes attractive to all parents.
Toshow that multiple equilibria can arise, we concentrate on the parameter space
where fully public schooling is the unique equilibrium when ¯ x = 0. We establish
that in this case there are at least three equilibria for ¯ x > 1 − σ.
Proposition 4 (Multiplicity of equilibria for ¯ x > 1 − σ )
If ¯ x, γ,a n dσ satisfy the conditions




there are at least three equilibria. One is a fully private regime, one a fully public regime,
and one features segregation.
In Figure 2 we take the same parameter values as in Figure 1 and we set σ = 0.5
and ¯ x = 0.7, which implies that the bottom 20% have no political power. There
20are now three ﬁxed points: s = 0, s = 0.017, and s = 0.037, with participation
Ψ = 0, Ψ = 0.3, and Ψ = 1.
The possibility of multiple equilibria exists because we assume that people have
to decide on fertility and public versus private schooling before the vote on the
quality of public education takes place. If all decisions were taken simultane-
ously, the voting process would lead to the same outcome as the weighted social
planning problem, which is generically unique. Pre-commitment generates mul-
tiplicity inthissetting, butnotin theversion with equalpolitical weights, because
there isnow a strategic complementarity betweenthe education choicesofskilled
people through the quality of public schools.15 When everybody with political
power uses private schools, an given individual does not want to switch to the
public system, since the quality of the public schooling is low. If, however, all
voters were to switch together to the public system, they would vote for a much
higher quality of public schools; in that case it would be rational to stay in the
public system. Here, the political bias towards the rich offsets the increased cost
of taxation resulting from higher participation in public schooling. Provided that
there is a strong concentration of political power, the model can account for the
fact that some countries with similar general characteristics choose very different
educational systems.16
The next proposition shows that despite the possibility of multiple equilibria, the
coverage of public schooling is never higher in societies dominated by the rich
than in democracies:
Proposition 5 (Coverage of public education as a function of ¯ x )
15When actions are strategic complements, the utility of those taking the action depends posi-
tivelyonhow manypeople takethe action. Classic examplesareMatsuyama(1991)for increasing
returns, Katz and Shapiro (1985) for network externalities, and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) for
bank runs.
16A number of authors have derived similar multiplicity results in other applications of voting
models. In Saint-Paul and Verdier (1997) there is majority voting on a capital income tax. If polit-
ical power is unequally distributed, and is biased in favor of households having better access to
world capital markets, expectations-driven multiple equilibria can arise. In a dynamic majority
voting framework, Hassler, Rodriguez Mora, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2003)assume that young
agents base their education decisions on expectations over future redistribution. Self-fulﬁlling
expectations can lead to either high or low redistribution equilibria. Finally, there are other polit-
ical economy models that do not have indeterminacy of equilibrium but display multiple steady
states(seefor exampleB´ enabou 2000or Doepke and Zilibotti 2005). Initial conditions, asopposed
to self-fulﬁlling expectations, determine which steady state the economy approaches.
21Let Ψ0 be the equilibrium coverage of public education for ˆ x = x0,a n dv 0 the correspond-





In summary, if the rich wield more power than the poor, multiple equilibria may
arise. In any such equilibrium, the coverage and quality of and spending on pub-
lic education cannot be higher than in the outcome with equal political weights.
Fully private education systems are always possible.
While we have established the results of this section for the extreme case where
households with an income below ¯ x do not wield any political power, the results
generalize to an environment where these households have some positive weight
in the political system, but lower than the weight of households with income
above ¯ x. In particular, it is easy to establish that, for any ¯ x, a fully private regime
exists if the weight of low-income people is sufﬁciently small. As before, if in this
case the unique equilibrium in the model with an even distribution of political
power is pure public schooling, at least three equilibria exist when the poor have
less political power.
5 Outcomes with Government Commitment
S of a rw eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tt h el e v e lo fg overnment spending on education is
determined afterprivate households havedecided whetherto send theirchildren
to private or public schools. In this section we analyze an alternative timing as-
sumption, namely, the voters elect a government which pre-commits to a given
overall spending level on education, while households can make their schooling
choice conditional on this spending. Even though under each timing assump-
tion people have perfect foresight, we will see that timing makes an important
difference. For the following analysis, we return to the assumption of an even
22distribution of political power, i.e. ¯ x = 0.
In the new timing, the government sets the tax rate at the beginning of the pe-
riod. Since the tax base is independent of the schooling choice, this is equivalent
to determining total spending on public education. After the tax is set, parents
choose fertility and public versus private education for their children. Public
schooling per child will then be simply given by the ratio of pre-committed to-
tal spending to the number of children in public schools. Since the government
has perfect foresight, the problem can be solved backwards by ﬁrst determining
individual decisions as a function of policies, and then choosing policies taking
this dependency into account.
Since fertility choices conditional on schooling are not affected by taxes, fertility
rates will be as before determined by equations (3) and (5). Private education
spending is also unaffected by the new timing of decisions and is given by equa-
tion (4). The participation decision is determined by the threshold deﬁned in





We also redeﬁne the endogenous fraction of children participating in the public
education system as a function of actual quality:
Ψ[s]=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0i f ˜ x[s] < 1 − σ
˜ x[s] − (1 − σ)
2σ
if 1 − σ ≤ ˜ x[s] ≤ 1 + σ
1i f ˜ x[s] > 1 + σ
(18)





The objective function modeling the voting process is the same as before, but Ψ
23and ˜ x are now endogenous:
Ω[s] ≡






The structure of the problem is similar to a standard Ramsey (1927) problem,
where the government chooses optimal taxes taking into account the reaction of
private agents. Once again three regimes are possible: fully public (Ψ[s]=1),
segregation (1 > Ψ[s] > 0), and fully private (Ψ[s]=0). In the segregation case,
the ﬁrst-order condition for optimization is as follows:











































T h eﬁ r s tl i n eo ft h i so p t i m a l i t yc o n d i t i o ni st h es a m ea st h eo n ew eg e ti nt h ep r o b -
lem without commitment. The second line is a new term which arises from the
endogenous dependency of Ψ on s. This term is always negative. The new neg-
ative term implies that under government commitment, the optimal s is lower
than under no-commitment, as long as the solution for Ψ is interior. Intuitively,
the government now takes into account that a marginal increase in s increases
the number of families who use public schools. On the margin this lowers the
value of the objective function, since the marginal family is just indifferent be-
tween private and public schooling, but imposes a ﬁscal burden on the rest of the
population once it switches from private to public school.
In the fully private and public regimes, participation Ψ[s] is locally independent
of s, as long as the marginal family strictly prefers its current schooling choice.
The additional term is therefore zero, and hence the optimal schooling choice
of s does not depend on government commitment. The following proposition
summarizes the result.
Proposition 6 (Equilibrium with commitment)
An equilibrium with commitment exists. Public school quality is lower than or equal to
the level reached without commitment. The inequality is strictif participation Ψ satisﬁes:
240 < Ψ < 1.
Existence is guaranteed because the objective function is continuous on a com-
pact set. The equilibrium is not guaranteed to be unique, however, because the
objective function is not globally concave. In particular, it has kinks at the values
of s corresponding to ˜ x[s]=1−σ and ˜ x[s]=1+ σ. However, multiplicity occurs
only for knife-edge cases.
If we extend this model to concentrated political power as in Section 4, we no
longer get generic multiplicity of equilibria. Under the original timing, multi-
ple equilibria arose as self-fulﬁlling prophecies. With government commitment,
the government moves ﬁrst and chooses the generically unique equilibrium that
maximizes the objective function.
Tosummarize, we seethat therelative timingofthe decisionstaken by individual
households and the government has an important bearing on the positive impli-
cations of our theory. Which timing, then, should be considered to be the most
realistic? Clearly, there is no general answer to this question, as political decision
horizons can vary substantially from country to country. It is useful, however, to
consider as a benchmark the common case of a government that adjusts the ed-
ucation budget (which determines the quality of public schooling) at an annual
frequency. As far as fertility decisions are concerned, the realistic assumption
then is that households move before the government. Children generally enter
school at age six, so that at the very minimum, six years pass from the fertility
decision until schooling actually begins. It is hard to imagine that the govern-
ment commits to a schooling quality more than six years ahead of time, without
any possibility of later adjustments.
In contrast, matters are less clear-cut when it comes to the choice of an education
system (i.e., whether to send one’s child to public or private school). We have
already analyzed the case where parents make this choice before the government
decides on school quality. What would happen if households chose fertility be-
fore the vote on schooling quality, but could adjust their choice of public ver-
sus private schooling after the vote? As we will see, this framework in which
households make at least one decision before the government leads to similar
implications as our original timing where the government moves last.
25In this intermediate case, when households choose fertility, they do so under
perfect foresight regarding the future quality of schools. There will be an income
threshold ¯ x below which people have large families (corresponding to the expec-
tation of public schooling). The objective of the voting process takes three differ-
ent forms depending on how the threshold for private education ˜ x[s] compares
to the threshold for small families ¯ x.F o r¯ x < ˜ x[s],i ti sg i v e nb y :
Ω[s]=
  ¯ x
0
u[x,v,ns,0,s]g[x]dx+







for ¯ x = ˜ x[s],w eh a v e
Ω[s]=






and for ¯ x > ˜ x[s],w eh a v e :
Ω[s]=
  ˜ x[s]
0
u[x,v,ns,0,s]g[x]dx+







If ¯ x  = ˜ x[s], as in the previous case the ﬁrst-order condition for optimality has
an additional term related to the marginal impact of s on ˜ x[s]. In equilibrium,
however, agents have perfect foresight, and ¯ x = ˜ x[s] will hold. In this case,
consider the s that maximizes the objective function holding ˜ x[s] constant at ¯ x,
as in our original timing. In Equation (21), in a neighborhood around this s,i ti s
the case that the marginal effect of a change in s on ˜ x is zero. The reason is that
agents below ¯ x have chosen large families in expectation of using public schools,
whereas families above ¯ x = ˜ x[s] have chosen small families in expectation of
private schooling. Families close to the threshold therefore strictly prefer their
expected schooling choice to the alternative. Thus for ¯ x = ˜ x[s] which occurs in
equilibrium, the ﬁrst-order condition is as in our original timing. If the solution
26is interior, this implies that the outcome has to be the same.17
To summarize, whether the model generates multiplicity of equilibria crucially
depends on the timing of private decisions relative to the determination of gov-
ernment policy. If parents make decisions that lock them into speciﬁc choices for
their children for a long time, whereas the government can adjust the quality of
public education more frequently, the possibility of multiple equilibria is present.
In the real world, the strength of these lock-in effects would depend on a number
of features that are not explicitly modeled in our theory. For example, in some
countries educational segregation is linked to residential segregation, i.e., there
aresome districtswhere mostlyrich peoplelivewhouseprivate schools, whereas
poorer districts are served by public schools. In such an environment, a switch
in the type of schooling would also entail a switch of residence, and maybe even
a switch of jobs if the distances are sufﬁciently large. Clearly, in such an environ-
ment the lock-in into a particular schooling type would be much stronger than
in a country where private and public schools exist right next to each other, with
few hurdles to switching schools.
6 Empirical Evidence
Our theory makes predictions on how the quality and extent of private and pub-
lic schooling are determined at the aggregate level, and on how schooling and
fertility choices vary across households within a given political entity. In this sec-
tion, we compare these predictions to data. We start by focusing on state-level
variation in the extent and quality of public education in the United States. This
setting is well suited to examine the predictions of our theory for democratic
countries, as all U.S. states operate within the same overall political framework,
while exhibiting considerable variation in schooling policies as well as the distri-
bution of income. Moreover, we are able to link state-level evidence to household
data from the U.S. Census to assess the micro implications of our theory. We then
17Depending on parameters, however, under the intermediate timing there can also be addi-
tional corner solutions. The original and intermediate timing lead to the same equilibria if the
lock-in effect through fertility is sufﬁciently strong. The strength of the lock-in effect, in turn,
depends on the fertility differential between parents with children in public and private schools.
27extend the analysis to cross-country data, which allows us to probe the theory’s
predictions for non-democratic countries. Here we use data from the OECD and
the World Bank on public and private education spending, as well as micro data
from the OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA).
6.1 Inequality, fertility, and schooling across U.S. states
Our model predicts that in a democracy, the choice of public versus private
schooling as well as the level of funding of public schooling are driven by income
inequality (see Proposition 3). In particular, a state with higher income inequal-
ity should exhibit a higher share of private schooling, lower overall spending on
public schooling, but higher public education spending per student. In addition,
the model predicts that a high-inequality state will have a relatively low fertility
rate, because parents who send their children to private school economize on fer-
tility. In this section, we examine whether these predictions hold up across U.S.
states.
We computed state-level measures of income inequality, average fertility, and the
share of private schooling from the 2000 U.S. Census.18 We correlate these vari-
ables with a number of measures of the spending on and the quality of public
schooling. In line with the setup of our theory, we focus on ﬁnancial measures.19
As an overall spending measure, we use public education spending per capita
in each state (this corresponds to the tax rate v in the model). For the quality
of public education (corresponding to the variable s in the model), we consider
three alternative measures. “Total Current Expenditure per Student” is a mea-
sure of total spending for day-to-day operation of schools, which includes all
expenditures of public schools apart from debt repayments, capital outlays, and
programs outside of preschool to grade 12. One concern with this broad mea-
sure is that it includes some items that may not have a direct educational impact.
We therefore also use the variable “Total Instruction Expenditure per Student,”
18The data is from the one-percent sample of the 2000 U.S. Census, made available at
www.ipums.org by Ruggles et al. (2004).
19There may also be differences in how efﬁciently a given amount of spending is converted
into “effective education,” but our theory makes no predictions in this dimension and assumes
that all states are at the efﬁciency frontier.
28Table 1: Correlation of Inequality and Share of Private Schooling with Fertility,
Education Spending, and the Quality of Public Schooling across U.S. States
Gini coefﬁcient Private school share
Private school share 0.36 (2.65)
Public spending per capita -0.45 (-3.51) -0.08 (-0.58)
Public spending per student 0.26 (1.84) 0.55 (4.57)
Public instruction spending per student 0.18 (1.23) 0.53 (4.34)
Mean teacher salary in public schools 0.25 (1.77) 0.61 (5.33)
Average number of children -0.48 (-3.74) -0.27 (-1.91)
t-Statistics in parentheses. “Gini Coefﬁcient” is computed on 1999 household income by state
(data from 2000 U.S. Census). “Sharein Private School” is the number of households with at least
half of their school-age children in private school as a fraction of the total number of households
with at least one child in school (data from 2000 U.S. Census). “Number of Children” is the
average number of children per household in the same data set, where children are counted only
ifthe headof household is their parentandif they arecurrentlyliving in the household. Measures
of education spending and quality of education are deﬁned in the text.
which only includes expenditures directly associated with student-teacher inter-
action such as teacher salaries and beneﬁts, textbooks and other teaching sup-
plies, and purchased instructional services. Finally, as an alternative measure
of the quality of instruction we use “Mean Teacher Salary,” an estimate of the
average annual salary of teachers in public elementary and secondary schools.20
Table 1 shows how income inequality (i.e., the Gini coefﬁcient on household in-
come by state) and the share of private schooling correlate with fertility and mea-
sures of education spending and quality across states. The correlations are in line
with the predictions of Proposition 3. In particular, the correlation between in-
equalityand the share of private schooling ispositive, whereas the correlation be-
tween inequality and per-capita spending on public education is negative. Taken
by themselves, these results might seem to suggest that more inequality leads
20The expenditure measures are from the National Center for Education Statistics, “Revenues
and Expenditures for Public Elementary and Secondary Education,” School Year 2000-2001. The
teacher salary data is provided by the National Education Association.
29to less redistribution in the sense of lower support for public education. How-
ever, this is not in fact the case when we consider the quality of public education
rather than overall spending. All three measures of the quality of public edu-
cation are positively correlated with inequality.21 This veriﬁes the third part of
Proposition 3.
The surprising ﬁnding that the correlation coefﬁcients of education spending per
capita and education spending per student are of opposite sign can be accounted
for by the effect of private schooling on the quality of public schooling. As in-
equality rises, more students use private schools, which makes it more affordable
to offer a high-quality education to those still in public schools. This effect can be
seen even more strongly when we correlate education quality with the share of
students in private school (second column of Table 1). For all three measures, the
correlation is positive and highly signiﬁcant. Hence, the theoretical implication
that as the share of private schooling increases, the quality of the public school
should increase as well seems to be well supported in the U.S. data. The ﬁnding
has important implications for the relationship of inequality and redistribution.
If one looked only at aggregate spending, one might think that more inequality
leads to less redistribution, as posited by B´ enabou (2000), among others. How-
ever, the per-person transfer to poorer households (i.e., the education quality
provided to households using public schools) does in fact go up. This is possible
because more inequality leads to more targeted transfers, as richer households
opt out of the public system.
The last row of Table 1 examines predictions for fertility rates. We ﬁnd that states
with more inequality and a higher share of private schooling have a lower fertil-
ity rate. This is in accordance with our model: parents economize on the number
of children if the direct cost of education is high.
21The correlation is signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level for total expenditure per student as well
as mean teacher salary.
306.2 Determinants of fertility and public versus private school-
ing at the household level
We now examine the inner workings of our model more closely with the help
of micro data from the U.S. Census. Our aim is to establish whether the model
paints a realistic picture of the interaction between household income, private
choices on education and fertility, and the quality of public schooling. This will
be useful to assess whether our model indeed provides a plausible mechanism
for generating the observed macro correlations. We draw on data on household
income, family size (i.e., the household head’s own children living in the house-
hold), public versus private schooling (for school-age children), and a number of
demographic controls from the one-percent sample of the 2000 U.S. Census.
Inthe model, ahousehold’sdecisionson fertilityandprivateversuspublicschool-
ing depend on two variables: income and the quality of public schooling (see
Lemma 2 and the preceding discussion). In particular, richer households are pre-
dicted to be more likely to choose private schools and to have lowerfertility rates.
The strength of the income effect depends on the quality of public schooling; for
example, if public schooling is of very high quality, even fairly rich households
will use public schools. To examine these predictions, Tables2 and 3 show regres-
sions of family size and private schooling on household income and a number of
controls.22 We use an ordered logit speciﬁcation for the fertility choice and a logit
speciﬁcation for the private education choice. All regressions contain dummy
variables for the age of the household head as well as the state of residence (the
effect of further controls is discussed below).
The ﬁrst column of each table presents results for regressions that only include
household income in addition to the standard controls. As predicted by the the-
ory, an increase in income is associated with a higher probability of using private
schooling as well as lower fertility.23 However, in this speciﬁcation the relation-
22In order to be able to include households that report zero income, we add $10 to household
income before taking logs. The results are qualitatively the same if we shift up incomes by $100
or $500 instead.
23The positive effect of income on the probability of private schooling has also been docu-
mented by Cohen-Zada and Justman (2003) and Epple, Figlio, and Romano (2004); see also
Nechyba (2006). However, these studies no not consider fertility choices and the interaction of
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































33ship between household income and fertility is not signiﬁcant at conventional
levels. The remaining columns focus on the joint effect of household income
and the quality of public schooling in determining private choices. Each regres-
sion contains an additional interaction term of household income with one of our
three measures of the quality of public schooling. Notice that schooling quality is
measured at the state level, not the household level.24 In essence, we are still esti-
mating a micro relationship between household income and private choices, but
we allow the slope of this relationship to vary systematically across states with a
high and a low quality of public education. We ﬁnd that in both regressions and
for all three measures of the quality of public schooling, the estimated coefﬁcient
on the interaction term is of the opposite sign as the coefﬁcient on income, which
implies that the effect of income on household choices diminishes as the quality
of public schooling goes up. When the interaction term is included, all parameter
estimates are highly signiﬁcant, with the one exception of the fertility regression
using mean teacher salary as a quality measure.
The size of the interaction terms implies substantial variation in the steepness of
the income-fertility and income-private schooling relationships across states with
a low and high quality of public schooling. In the states with the highest quality
of public education, these relationships are essentially ﬂat. This is exactly what
one should expect based on the theory: states with high-quality public schooling
are close to a fully public regime, i.e., most parents use public schools regardless
of income, and fertility varies little across income groups.
The regression results are robust with respect to a number of changes to the spec-
iﬁcation of the model. We have explored sensitivity to racial composition by es-
timating the regressions separately by race and by including race dummies, we
have checked urban/rural differences by including a metropolitan area dummy,
and we have run the regressions on restricted samples that limit the age range
of the included households. Generally, the sign and signiﬁcance of the interac-
tion term in the two regressions is robust to these changes, as is the sign and
signiﬁcance of the total income effect in the education equation. The sign of the
24The factthat schooling quality is a state-levelvariablealso precludesusing it in the regression
directly, because our regressions already contain state dummies. As a robustness test, we also
carried out regressions without state dummies and schooling quality as an included variable,
with overall similar results.
34total income effect in the fertility regression turns out to be more sensitive. In
particular, for black and Hispanic households the total income effect is strongly
negative, whereas for white households it is positive. However, when we restrict
the sample to the ages 25–45, the total income effect is once again negative and
signiﬁcant. This suggests that for older white people, the slope of the relation
between fertility and income can be reversed.25 However, even in the case of a
positive slope, the sign of the interaction term is still the same.
6.3 Inequality, fertility, and schooling across countries
We now turn to the determinants of education systems across countries. Com-
pared to our analysis of education in U.S. states, cross-country data pose addi-
tional difﬁculties. There are substantial differences in the level of development
and in unobserved variables such as the political system, religious values etc.
across countries which could have independent effects on the variables of inter-
est.26 Doing full justice to the arising empirical issues is beyond the scope of this
paper. As a consequence, we focus on documenting the fundamental correlations
and micro relationships implied by our theory.
The OECD provides internationally comparable data on the relative proportions
of public and private investment in education for the period 1985–1998. In most
countries, private sector expenditure is comprised mainly of household expen-
ditures on tuition and other fees. The exception is Germany, where nearly all
private expenditure is accounted for by contributions from the business sector
to the system of apprenticeship at the upper secondary level. For primary and
lower secondary education, there is little private funding in Germany. In 1998,
25To some extent, this ﬁnding could be due to the fact that in the Census, we only observe
children who still live in the household. If rich, white households have children relatively late
in life, they would appear to have unusually many children in their household at a time when
other parents’ children have already left to form their own households. This type of effect is not
picked up by a simple age dummy, but can be partially addressed by restricting the age range of
households included in the sample.
26The literature contains few empirical studies on the determinants of the mix between public
and private education across countries. One exception is James (1993), who regresses private
enrollments sharesfor 50countries around1980on a number of determinants, and concludes that
cultural factors such as religious competition and linguistic heterogeneity play an important role.
However, the small number of observations compared to the number of explanatory variables












































Figure 3: Inequality and education systems across countries
the data set contains information on a number of non-OECD countries (Israel,
Uruguay, CzechRepublic, Turkey, Argentina, Indonesia, Chile, Peru, Philippines,
and Thailand). With observations on 31 countries, we can investigate whether
inequality is a good predictor of private funding. Computing the correlation
between the Gini coefﬁcient for income inequality in 1970 (from Deininger and
Squire 1996) and the share of private funding in 1998, we ﬁnd that the correlation
is positive and strong with a coefﬁcient of 0.44 (t-stat=2.64).27 The correlation in-
creases to 0.55 (t-stat=3.55) if we consider only the primary and secondary levels
of education. Figure 3 presents the cross plot of the private share in primary and
secondary education with the Gini coefﬁcient.
We next turn to micro data from the OECD Programme for International Student
Assessment (PISA), which comprises data collected in the year 2000 on 15 year-
old students in the principal industrialized countries. It includes a student ques-
tionnaire collecting information about the student’s family and a school ques-
tionnaire that covers information on the extent of public funding and the pub-
lic or private administration of schools. We focus on four variables in the PISA
27We use the Gini coefﬁcient in 1970 to address possible reverse causality from schooling to
inequality.
36database. The International Socioeconomic Index (ISEI) captures the attributes
of occupations that converts parents’ education into income. It was obtained by
mapping parents’ occupational codes onto an index of occupational status, de-
veloped by Ganzeboom, De Graaf, and Treiman (1992). This index provides a
rough measure of household income and human capital (unfortunately, house-
hold income itself is not contained in the data base). Using the index, students
are assigned to one of four social classes.28 The second student-speciﬁc variable
in our data set is the number of siblings. At the school level, our data set contains
information on the funding sources of schools and whether a school is publicly or
privately run. For school funding, our variable is the percentage of total funding
that stems from government sources, as opposed to fees paid by parents, bene-
factors, or other sources of income.
For each country, we have computed average school characteristics for the four
social classes. For each group, we report the average share of education spend-
ing covered by public sources (the subsidization rate), the share of students in
private schools, and the average fertility rate. The detailed results are provided
in Appendix B. Overall, the ﬁndings are once again consistent with the theory:
in the vast majority of cases, participation in private schooling increases and fer-
tility decreases with social status.
An interesting feature of the PISA data is that it covers countries that appearto be
characterized by different schooling regimes. Inparticular, a number of countries
come close to what could be described as a fully public regime. To investigate
the effects of having a fully public schooling regime, we deﬁne countries as fully
public if the difference in the subsidization rate between the highest and lowest
social class is less than ﬁve percent.29 The remaining countries are classiﬁed as
28Typical occupations in the lowest class (between 16 and 35 points on the ISEI scale) include
small-scale farmer, metalworker, mechanic, taxi or truck driver, and waiter/waitress. Between
35 and 53 index points, the most common occupations are bookkeeping, sales, small business
management, and nursing. As the required skills increase, so does the status of the occupation.
Between 54 and 70 points, typical occupations are marketing management, teaching, civil engi-
neering, andaccounting. Inthe highest class(from71to 90points), occupations include medicine,
university teaching, and law.
29This group includes Hungary, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland,
Latvia, The Netherlands, Norway, Russia and Sweden. Appendix B also provides the propor-
tion of students attending private schools. The school type is determined by the question “Is
your school a public or a private school.” Here public schools are those managed by a public
37being in the segregation regime. We also separately consider the ﬁve countries
with the highest difference in the public subsidization rate of the lowest and the
highest social class (Austria, Australia, Brazil, Mexico, and Spain). In this group,
the difference between the subsidization rate of schools attended by members of
the top and bottom social classes averages 25 percent.
Table 4 provides a number of statistics for the groups of countries with different
education regimes. Not surprisingly, in the fully public group the level of public
subsidization is particularly high with an average of 96 percent. These countries
are also characterized by low income inequality (average Gini: 24.7), and the
fertility differential between the bottom and top social classes is only 0.36.30 In
contrast, the group of countries in the segregation regime has an average Gini of
34.6 and a fertility differential of 0.47. The ﬁve countries with the highest level
of segregation also top the list in terms of inequality and differential fertility: the
average Gini coefﬁcient is 44.6 in this group, and the fertility differential between
the bottom and top social classes amounts to 0.59. The last row of Table 4 presents
correlation coefﬁcients betweenthe Ginicoefﬁcient and the other variables across
all countries in the data set. As predicted by the theory, in countries with higher
income inequality average public funding is lower, the subsidization rate is more
sensitive to social class, and fertility differentials are larger.31
6.4 Public education spending and democracy
We now turn to the ﬁnal implication of our theory, namely the effect of democ-
racy on education politics. Given that data on private spending on education
education authority, a government agency, or a governing board that is appointed either by the
government directly or elected by public franchise. While we could have used this variable to
deﬁne countries as fully public, for our purposes the public subsidization rate is a better indica-
tor of public versus private schooling than the school type, because “private school” can mean
different things in different countries. In Belgium, for example, most schools are nominally pri-
vate, yet are entirely publicly funded. Nevertheless, using the school type variable instead of the
school funding variable leads to similar results.
30In all the countries we ﬁnd that the fertility of the lowest social class exceeds the fertility of
the highest social group. In a majority of countries, the relationship between fertility and social
status is monotonically decreasing; in some countries, it is U-shaped.
31One concern here is a reverse causality link whereby school segregation leads to more in-
equality. The problem is mitigated by the fact that we use Gini coefﬁcients measured 20 years




















































































































































































































































































































































































39is available for only a few countries, we focus on public spending on education
as a fraction of GDP. Here we have a sample of 158 countries covering the pe-
riod 1970-2002 (with some missing observations; data from World Bank Devel-
opment Indicators). We divide the sample into three groups, based on their level
of democracy. As a democracy indicator, we use the political-rights index from
the Freedom in the World Country Ratings. The index lies on a one-to-seven
scale, with one representing the highest degree of freedom. We assign the coun-
tries into three groups, where “free” countries have an index of one, “partially
free” have values from two to four, and “non-free” countries have values from
ﬁve to seven.
T a b l e5d i s p l a y st h em e a na n dv a r i a n c eo fpublic spending on education for the
three groups of countries. The mean of spending is increasing with democracy,
whereas the variance is decreasing. Figure 4 presents a density estimation of the
entire distribution of public spending as a share of GDP for the three groups.
The density for partially free and non-free countries displays a lower mean and
a higher variance. Two-tailed tests of whether the differences are signiﬁcant are
provided in Table 6. The mean in democratic (free) countries is signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from the one in the two other groups, and the variance in the non-free
countries is signiﬁcantly higher than in the partially free-countries, which is it-
self higher than in the free group. These ﬁndings are in line with the predictions
of our theory for the case of an uneven distribution of political power (see Propo-
sitions 4 and 5). Clearly, our mechanism is not the only possible explanation for
the observed high variance in public educations pending in non-democracies,
but it is encouraging that the predictions of the model are in line with data along
this dimension as well.
7 Conclusions
The education of its citizens is one of main areas of government intervention in
every country in the world. At the same time, the government is generally not
the only provider of education; education systems often display a juxtaposition
of public and privately funded institutions. The degree of private involvement
in the provision of education varies a great deal over different countries, going
40Table 5: Public Spending on Education in Democracies and Non-Democracies
Democracy index Observations Mean Variance
Free (= 1) 1020 4.96 3.08
Partially free (1 < x ≤ 4) 836 4.11 7.07
Non-free (4 < x ≤ 7) 644 4.07 8.33






Legend: Free (solid line), partially free (dots), non-free (dashes).
Note: Density estimation using the NonParametrix.m Package
by Bernard Gress, 2004
Figure 4: Density of public education spending (percent of GDP)
Table 6: Mean and Variance Tests for Public Education Spending in Democracies
and Non-Democracies
Mean difference test Variance ratio test
Partially free Non-free Partially free Non-free
Free 0.85 (0.00) 0.89 (0.00) 0.44 (0.00) 0.37 (0.00)
Partially free 0.03 (0.82) 0.85 (0.03)
p-values in parentheses.
41from fully public systems as in some European countries to segregated systems
as in parts of the United States. In this paper, we try to understand how countries
choose the mix of public and private education.
We ﬁrst conclude that high inequality maps into a segregated education system.
In a segregated system, the quality of public schools is sufﬁciently low for rich
households to prefer paying for private schools to enhance the education of their
children. When inequality is low, on the other hand, the rich decide to send
their children to public schools, so that they avoid paying for education twice
(ﬁrst through taxes, second through private schools). The prediction of a strong
relationship between inequality and the extent of public schooling is in line with
the empirical evidence. In both cross-country data and cross-state data in the
U.S., we ﬁnd that public spending on education is negatively related to income
inequality.
Turning to the role of political power, we ﬁnd that the quality and extent of pub-
lic schooling generally increases with the political weight of the poor. In addi-
tion, if the poor are given at least equal weight in the political system, there is a
unique equilibrium outcome. In societies that are politically dominated by the
rich, on the other hand, multiple equilibria may arise. The reason is that when
the rich are in charge, there is a complementarity between the number of rich
people participating in public schools and their quality. For given initial con-
ditions, such a country may either have a high-quality public schooling system
in which many or all of the rich participate, or a low-quality system with all
the rich using private schools. Despite the multiplicity, however, we ﬁnd that
spending on public education is never higher in a society dominated by the rich
than in an otherwise identical economy where the poor have equal power. The
model therefore provides an explanation for the observation that non-democratic
countries spend on average a smaller fraction of GDP on public education than
democracies, whereas the variance of spending across countries is higher among
non-democracies.
Whilewehaveconcentrated oncross-sectional evidence,anotherimportantques-
tion for future research is why public education was ﬁrst introduced in the nine-
teenth century during the second phase of the Industrial Revolution. Galor and
Moav(2006)argue thatinthis period capitalistsstarted tohave aninterest inpub-
42liceducation, becauseofcomplementaritiesbetweenphysicalandhumancapital.
Therefore, technological change strengthening this complementarity may have
contributed to the introduction of public schooling. Galor, Moav, and Vollrath
(2006) extend this analysis by distinguishing different sources of wealth. If land
islesscomplementary tohuman capital than physical capital, aconﬂict of interest
arises between land-owners and capitalists. The outcome of this conﬂict depends
on the distribution of wealth and land-ownership.
In our model, public schooling always arises if political power is equally shared.
The theory therefore points to the expansion of voting rights in the nineteenth
century as a key explanation for the introduction of public schooling. This still
leaves open the question why voting rights were expanded in the ﬁrst place. The
theory of Galor and Moav (2006) offers one potential explanation. Acemoglu and
Robinson (2000), however, point in a different direction: the rich shared power
in order to avoid the threat of a revolution. In either case, given that the poor
did gain political inﬂuence, in our model the introduction of public schooling
is a necessary consequence. Once public education is in place, the size of the
public system depends on the evolution of the income distribution. To this end,
the model points to the declining income in e q u a l i t yo b s e r v e da r o u n dt h et u r no f
the century as a potential explanation for the large expansion of public education
that followed its initial introduction.
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46A Technical Appendix
Proof of Lemma1: From budgetconstraint (2) total spendingon children isgiven
by xφn + ne. Substituting either n = ns and e = 0o rn = ne and e = ηφx/(1 − η)
yields that




T a x a b l ei n c o m et h e r e f o r ei s





Proof of Lemma 2: We compute the level x such that a household with in-





[E](s) with: δ =( 1 − η)
1
η.(6)
˜ x is bigger than zero and depends positively on [E](s).I f x is greater (resp.
smaller) than ˜ x, u[x,v,ns,0,[E](s)] is smaller (resp. greater) than u[x,v,ne,e,0],
and the household prefers private (resp. public) education, which proves the
Lemma. 
Proof of Proposition 1: The result follows from an application of the Brouwer
ﬁxed point theorem. Given (11), the equilibrium expected schooling quality E[s]








Weare now going to deﬁne a mapping Δ from E[s] into s which mapsthis interval
into itself. Since an equilibrium requires E[s]=s, a unique equilibrium exists if
the mapping has unique ﬁxed point.
Given expected schooling quality E[s], according to Lemma 2 and equation (7)















This function is (weakly) increasing in E[s]; the higher the expected quality of
public education, the more parents are going to prefer using the public sector.
47We can now use (11) to map the expected education quality E[s] into the actual
education quality s that would result from the political system if fraction Ψ(E[s])

















An equilibrium is characterized by a ﬁxed point of Δ(E[s]), i.e., a schooling level
s that satisﬁes s = Δ(s), so that the schooling quality s that is expected by the par-
ents is identical to the one actually implemented in the political process. Given
(23), Δ is a continuous, weakly decreasing function mapping the closed interval
given in (22) into itself. The mapping therefore crosses the 45-degree line exactly
once, and a unique equilibrium exists. 
Proof of Proposition 2: We ﬁrst show that the private regime is not an equilib-
rium outcome. In a reductio ad absurdum argument, we would start by assum-
ing the existence of such a case. We start from the optimal value of s given in
Equation (11). From this equation, we observe that as Ψ tends to zero, s tends
to ηφ. With this quality of public schooling, the equilibrium income threshold
(from Equation (6) is: ˜ x[ηφ]=( 1 − η)/δ. For private education to be an equi-
librium, this threshold should be lower than or equal to lowest income 1 − σ.
Given the deﬁnition of δ =( 1 − η)1/η,w eh a v et h a tδ < 1 − η which implies
x[ηφ] > 1 > 1 − σ. Hence, with a quality of public schools going to ηφ,i ti s
always optimal for the poorest person to chose public education. Therefore, the
private regime cannot arise in equilibrium.
If the public regime is an equilibrium, it has Ψ = 1a n ds = ηφ/(1 + γη) (from
Equation (11)). For this to be an equilibrium, we need the richest person to send
his children to public school, which requires ˜ x[ηφ/(1 + γη)] ≥ 1+ σ.T h i sc o n d i -
tion can be written:
1 − η
δ(1 + γη)
≥ 1 + σ.
If γ ≥ ˆ γ =( 1 − δ − η)/(δη), the right hand side of the inequality is below 1, and
the inequality can never be satisﬁed. This condition links the taste for children γ
to the weight of education η independently of σ.I fγ < ˆ γ, the above inequality
can be rewritten as a condition on σ, which in the condition of the Proposition.
It remains to show that γ < ˆ γ ⇔ Ψ > 1/2. Ψ = 1/2 implies that the equilibrium
is segregated. We solve for the equilibrium value of Ψ, which is given by:
Ψ =
−γδη(1 − σ) − 2δσ+
 
8γδησ(1 − δ(1 − σ) − η)+( γδη(1 − σ)+2δσ)
2
4γδησ
48There is only one value of γ for which this big expression is equal to 1/2, and it
is ˆ γ.S i n c eΨ is a continuous function of γ, and that we already know that it can
be equal to 1 for certain values of σ if γ < ˆ γ,w ec o n c l u d et h a tΨ > 1/2 for γ < ˆ γ
and Ψ < 1/2 for γ > ˆ γ. 
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If Ψ ∈ (0,1),
∂Ψ
∂σ




In the public regime,
Ψ = 1, ⇒ ∂Ψ/∂σ = 0. (25)
Proposition 2 together with (12), (24) and (25) imply Proposition 3. 
Proof of Proposition 4: As in the proof of Proposition 1, we will proceed by
analyzing the mapping from expected schooling quality E[s] into actual quality
s. Given (16), a schooling quality of zero is now possible, so that E[s] and s lie in
the following interval:
E[s],s ∈ [0,ηφ] (26)
Weare now going to deﬁne a mapping ¯ Δ from E[s] into s which mapsthis interval
into itself. Since an equilibrium requires E[s]=s, any equilibrium corresponds
to a ﬁxed point of the mapping.
Given expected schooling quality E[s], according to Lemma 2 and equation (7)















This function is (weakly) increasing in E[s]; the higher the expected quality of
public education, the more parents are going to prefer using the public sector.
We can now use (16) to map the expected education quality E[s] into the actual
education quality s that would result from the political system if fraction Ψ(E[s])
49of families participated in the public system. This education quality s = ¯ Δ(E[s])
is given by:
¯ Δ(E[s]) = max
 
ηφ(1 − σ − ¯ x + 2σΨ(E[s]))




An equilibrium is characterized by a ﬁxed point of ¯ Δ(E[s]), i.e., a schooling level
s that satisﬁes s = ¯ Δ(s), so that the schooling quality s that is expected by the par-
ents is identical to the one actually implemented in the political process. Given
Ψ(E[s]) and the properties of (16) stated in the text, ¯ Δ is a continuous function
mapping the closed interval given in (26) into itself. Due to the Brouwer ﬁxed
point theorem, at least one equilibrium exists. Also notice that Ψ = 0i sa l w a y s
an equilibrium, since ¯ Δ(E[0]) = 0.
Now assume that conditions γ < ˆ γ and σ < ˆ σ are satisﬁed. We want to establish
that in this case pure public schooling Ψ = 1 is an equilibrium. In (28), the
schooling quality corresponding to Ψ = 1i ss = ηφ/(1 + γη).T h e ﬁ r s t t e r m






































where γ < ˆ γ guarantees that the right-hand side of the ﬁrst equation is positive,
and the inequality follows from σ ≤ ˆ σ. The public education education quality
s = ηφ/(1 + γη) is therefore mapped into Ψ(s)=1, which, in turn, implies
Ψ(s)=s. Therefore, if pure public schooling is an equilibrium under an equal
division of political power, it is still an equilibrium with a voting threshold ¯ x <
1 − σ. Since pure private schooling is always an equilibrium, we have at least
two equilibria in this case. Next, notice that the slope of ¯ Δ(s) is zero at s = 0,
since for sufﬁciently small s we still have Ψ = 0. Also, at s = ηφ/(1 + γη) the
slope of ¯ Δ(s) is zero as well, since given σ < ˆ σ we have Ψ = 1 in a neighborhood
of s = ηφ/(1 + γη).G i v e nt h a t¯ Δ(s) is continuous, it has to cross the 45-degree
line at least one more time in between those values, implying the existence of a
third equilibrium, which features segregation. 
















where the left-hand side is the schooling level that arises for a given Ψ as a given
by (16), and the right-hand side is the level that arises with equal political power
as given by (11). Since the reverse mapping from a given schooling quality into
Ψ does not depend on the distribution of political power, this inequality implies
that the mappings Δ and ¯ Δ deﬁned in the proofs of Propositions 1 and 4 satisfy
¯ Δ(s) ≤ Δ(s). Equilibria in the two environments corresponds to levels of s that
satisfy s = ¯ Δ(s) and s = Δ(s), respectively. It was established in the proof of
Proposition 1 that Δ(s) is weakly decreasing and crosses the 45-degree line only
once from above. Since ¯ Δ(s) ≤ Δ(s), it then follows that ¯ Δ cannot cross the
4 5 - d e g r e el i n ea b o v et h eu n i q u ec r o s s i n gp o i n tf o rΔ(s),s ot h a tw eh a v e¯ s ≤ s.
Finally, the relationship between s and v does not depend on the distribution
of political power, and taxes are monotonically increasing in s,s ot h a tw eh a v e
¯ v ≤ v. 
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Country Social Number of Subsidization Percent in Fertility
status observations rate private schools
Australia 16-35 939 76.95 NA 3.30
36-53 1777 72.33 NA 3.05
54-70 1607 65.04 NA 2.94
71-90 542 58.77 NA 2.83
Austria 16-35 874 95.52 4.46 2.81
36-53 2213 91.60 9.26 2.58
54-70 992 86.19 16.23 2.40
71-90 276 80.62 26.09 2.63
Belgium 16-35 1558 89.21 68.87 3.01
36-53 2388 88.08 75.63 2.59
54-70 1573 85.46 81.25 2.66
71-90 516 84.76 83.33 2.75
Brazil 16-35 1699 87.93 2.35 3.67
36-53 831 79.52 10.59 3.36
54-70 926 66.77 23.00 3.07
71-90 125 41.60 49.60 2.86
Canada 16-35 6502 90.36 0.00 3.07
36-53 9536 89.94 0.00 2.84
54-70 9006 87.83 0.00 2.81
71-90 2302 85.12 0.00 2.86
Czech Republic 16-35 1064 93.07 7.33 2.81
36-53 2741 94.06 6.20 2.48
54-70 1141 94.71 6.22 2.32
71-90 309 95.25 6.47 2.19
Denmark 16-35 883 95.11 20.50 3.05
36-53 1445 94.75 23.18 2.81
54-70 1130 94.42 24.78 2.88
71-90 271 94.50 25.46 2.87
Finland 16-35 1010 99.84 1.58 3.26
36-53 1911 99.85 3.30 2.94
54-70 1453 99.83 3.51 2.86
71-90 381 99.78 4.72 2.88
France 16-35 1191 78.29 22.50 3.14
36-53 1443 75.57 21.83 2.62
54-70 929 73.36 20.67 2.61
71-90 268 69.29 26.12 2.89
52Country Social Number of Subsidization Percent in Fertility
status observations rate private schools
Germany 16-35 887 97.89 2.03 2.77
36-53 1970 97.84 3.40 2.46
54-70 1105 96.56 6.52 2.38
71-90 357 96.11 7.84 2.46
Greece 16-35 1278 85.63 1.10 2.68
36-53 1447 87.02 2.07 2.44
54-70 1074 82.60 4.38 2.31
71-90 280 72.52 15.71 2.24
Hungary 16-35 1022 85.76 3.82 2.74
36-53 2070 86.68 4.01 2.42
54-70 1281 88.20 3.51 2.30
71-90 261 90.18 6.13 2.38
Iceland 16-35 572 99.58 0.00 3.80
36-53 1300 99.52 0.62 3.46
54-70 926 99.10 1.30 3.37
71-90 364 98.82 1.92 3.46
Ireland 16-35 990 94.68 50.71 3.94
36-53 1463 91.43 63.98 3.52
54-70 1040 87.83 72.21 3.33
71-90 183 81.23 78.69 3.25
Italy 16-35 1391 79.47 2.16 2.45
36-53 1995 74.50 5.81 2.30
54-70 896 74.53 5.80 2.22
71-90 281 71.17 6.05 2.34
Korea 16-35 1554 53.63 47.23 2.46
36-53 1840 48.12 50.00 2.25
54-70 803 46.47 49.69 2.18
71-90 96 42.19 45.83 2.20
Mexico 16-35 1607 44.74 3.17 4.33
36-53 1134 40.15 17.20 3.74
54-70 619 34.52 33.60 3.39
71-90 222 29.87 49.55 2.95
Netherlands 16-35 480 94.93 72.92 3.09
36-53 739 94.59 77.00 2.80
54-70 807 93.86 76.70 2.79
71-90 153 94.85 71.90 2.86
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New Zealand 16-35 643 84.82 0.78 3.56
36-53 1275 81.16 3.61 3.20
54-70 1041 78.20 5.86 3.07
71-90 339 73.19 12.39 2.86
Norway 16-35 418 99.57 0.72 3.40
36-53 1737 99.71 0.63 2.98
54-70 1148 99.53 1.13 2.99
71-90 538 99.39 1.12 2.95
Poland 16-35 1052 94.78 0.38 3.07
36-53 1449 92.08 2.00 2.75
54-70 564 91.24 4.08 2.49
71-90 156 82.51 13.46 2.45
Portugal 16-35 1843 89.10 7.27 2.67
36-53 1501 86.67 6.46 2.33
54-70 747 83.58 8.17 2.23
71-90 278 77.73 7.55 2.28
Russia 16-35 1594 94.19 0.00 2.91
36-53 2742 93.38 0.00 2.71
54-70 1135 92.94 0.00 2.66
71-90 828 94.15 0.00 2.44
Spain 16-35 2078 90.92 24.01 2.60
36-53 2020 82.93 42.48 2.36
54-70 902 73.21 55.21 2.40
71-90 387 59.13 68.22 2.50
Switzerland 16-35 1290 98.28 2.56 2.93
36-53 2398 96.20 5.50 2.58
54-70 1351 93.73 8.44 2.54
71-90 582 89.72 13.40 2.68
United Kingdom 16-35 1858 98.24 0.65 3.44
36-53 3166 96.50 2.46 2.99
54-70 2276 89.99 8.92 2.82
71-90 856 84.93 14.02 2.82
United States 16-35 584 94.01 4.11 3.80
36-53 840 92.42 5.12 3.54
54-70 899 92.84 5.01 3.10
71-90 202 87.18 7.92 3.02
54